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Abstract: 1 
Background 2 
Dementia can result in cognitive, non-cognitive and behavioural symptoms which are 3 
difficult to manage. Formal guidelines for the care and management of dementia in the UK 4 
state that antipsychotics should only be prescribed where fully justified. This is because 5 
inappropriate use, particularly problematic in care home settings, can produce severe side-6 
effects including death. The aim of this study was to explore the use of fallacious arguments 7 
in professionals’ deliberations about antipsychotic prescribing in dementia in care-home 8 
settings. Fallacious arguments have the potential to become unremarkable discourses that 9 
construct and validate practices which are counter to guidelines.  10 
Methods 11 
This qualitative study involved interviews with 28 care-home managers and health 12 
professionals involved in caring for patients with dementia. Potentially fallacious arguments 13 
were identified using qualitative content analysis and a coding framework constructed from 14 
existing explanatory models of fallacious reasoning.  15 
Key findings 16 
Fallacious arguments were identified in a range of explanations and reasons that participants 17 
gave in answer to questions about initiating, reducing doses of, and stopping antipsychotics in 18 
dementia. The dominant fallacy was false dichotomy. Appeal to popularity, tradition, 19 
consequence, emotion, or fear, and the slippery slope argument were also identified.  20 
Conclusions 21 
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Fallacious arguments were often formulated to present convincing cases whereby prescribing 1 
antipsychotics or maintaining existing doses (versus not starting medication or reducing the 2 
dose, for example) appeared as the only acceptable decision but this is not always the case. 3 
The findings could help health professionals to recognise and mitigate the effect of logic-4 
based errors in decisions about the prescribing of antipsychotics in dementia.   5 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Dementia, which is characterised by an impairment of cognitive function, can also lead to 2 
non-cognitive symptoms and behaviour that challenges carers and others. In the UK, the 3 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides detailed guidance on the 4 
care and treatment of dementia, including interventions for cognitive as well as non-cognitive 5 
symptoms and behaviours [1]. The guidelines advocate that a range of non-pharmacological 6 
interventions should be considered for those who develop non-cognitive symptoms or 7 
behaviour that challenges and that pharmacological intervention (e.g. antipsychotics) should 8 
be offered in the first instance only where patients are severely distressed or there is an 9 
immediate risk of harm to the person or others, and only after a range of other conditions 10 
have been met [1].  11 
Yet it is estimated that only 20% of 180,000 patients with dementia who are prescribed an 12 
antipsychotic each year may actually benefit from taking these medications [2]. This was one 13 
of the findings of Professor Banerjee’s landmark report which investigated the use of 14 
antipsychotics for people with dementia in the National Health Service in England [2]. 15 
Banerjee reported that inappropriate use could be resulting in an additional 1,620 16 
cerebrovascular events and another 1,800 deaths each year. This was despite existing 17 
warnings by various medicines regulators about the use of antipsychotics in dementia [3-5]. 18 
Since then, several national studies and audits have shown a general downward trend in 19 
antipsychotics prescribing in dementia using information from primary care clinical systems 20 
[6] and hospitals [7-9].  But these data do not reveal the prescribing pattern in care homes 21 
where a third of UK patients with dementia are estimated to reside [10].  Care homes are 22 
accommodation that provide 24-hour nursing care (i.e. nursing homes), personal care only 23 
(i.e. residential homes) or a combination of both to older people in the UK. 24 
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A qualitative study with old age psychiatrists exploring the prescribing of psychotropic 1 
medication in dementia uncovered a range of views [11].  Psychiatrists thought there were 2 
pressures on them to prescribe, felt societal and systemic influences maintained high 3 
prescribing rates, guidelines were not implementable, and care homes were not designed and 4 
staff not trained to deal with problematic behaviours. While some of these views may be 5 
valid, problematic arguments relating to antipsychotic prescribing in dementia, especially if 6 
they become everyday discourses, are potentially significant as they could reinforce poor 7 
practice, but this concept has not been formally investigated. The premise of this paper is that 8 
reasoning errors could have a role in constructing and validating antipsychotic prescribing in 9 
dementia in practice akin to what has been argued to occur in attention deficit hyperactivity 10 
disorder (ADHD) by Tait [12].  Reasoning errors in this context are invalid or faulty 11 
explanations used in a discussion resulting in erroneous or fallacious arguments.  Tait studied 12 
the contribution of fallacious reasoning in reinforcing the veracity of ADHD as a mental 13 
health condition [12].  Using the typology set out by Fearnside and Holther (cited in [12]) of 14 
material, psychological, logical fallacies, Tait presented numerous examples to illustrate the 15 
way in which fallacious arguments potentially verify the existence of ADHD and therefore a 16 
need for its treatment. The diagnosis and treatment of ADHD has been brought into question 17 
by others [13,14] but Tait’s position was that logic-based errors could influence everyday 18 
medical practice—fallacious arguments about ADHD become unremarkable discourses that 19 
construct and validate ADHD as a treatable disorder leading to prescribing where it might not 20 
be warranted. The case being made was that fallacious arguments potentially endorse 21 
inappropriate prescribing.  22 
The claim that fallacious arguments could underline potentially inappropriate prescribing is 23 
novel and worthy of further consideration. The aim of this paper is to explore professionals’ 24 
deliberations about antipsychotic prescribing in dementia for evidence of fallacious 25 
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arguments using qualitative content analysis [15] and a constructivist approach [16]. The 1 
research question was “Do health professionals and care-home managers use fallacious 2 
arguments in discussions about antipsychotic prescribing in dementia and if so, what is the 3 
nature of these?” 4 
METHODS 5 
Compliance with Ethical Standards  6 
The University’s Research Ethics Committee (UREC 1217), and the local NHS Research & 7 
Development office (letter of access granted 22/06/2012) and Primary Care Research 8 
Partnership (reference TV85) reviewed and approved the research. Written consent from each 9 
participant was obtained before the interviews. 10 
Design 11 
Professionals with a role in the care and management of patients with dementia in care homes 12 
were recruited to the study using purposive sampling to select primary- and secondary-care 13 
doctors, care-home managers, primary-care pharmacists, and community psychiatric nurses. 14 
A memory clinic nurse and a social worker were later recruited on the recommendation of 15 
existing interviewees. Recruitment was through posted letters using publicly-available 16 
addresses or through known contacts and already recruited interviewees. In-depth semi-17 
structured face-to-face interviews were carried out by a doctoral student, supervised by the 18 
author, using interview schedules that focused first on general descriptions of dementia and 19 
the progression of this condition, before considering beliefs about and professional 20 
experiences with antipsychotic prescribing in dementia. Interview schedules were piloted 21 
with three volunteer participants before use. The interviews were audio-recorded. Participants 22 
were recruited until no more new codes and concepts emerged to inform the study (i.e. 23 
sampling saturation).  24 
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Data analysis  1 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim into password-protected documents, removing 2 
certain information to keep data anonymised/de-identifiable. The doctoral student ensured 3 
data integrity in consultation with the author. A master table of fallacies was constructed 4 
from the explanatory model described by Tait [12] and other published sources [17,18] 5 
(Table 1). The qualitative content analysis was undertaken by a consortium of six Masters-6 
level students of pharmacy who worked with the author to learn the analytical process during 7 
a 3-month training period preceding data analysis. Each student was asked to individually 8 
analyse the same sample section of interview transcript with reference to Table 1. Group 9 
meetings allowed students  to compare and contrast the coding and discuss and resolve any 10 
differences to reach consensus on the analytical approach.  11 
After familiarization with each transcript, the text was examined line-by-line to identify 12 
potentially fallacious arguments with reference to Table 1. The sentences and phrases 13 
appearing to exhibit fallacious reasoning were all labelled. Then during a second coding 14 
phase each initial code was examined in more detail to delineate the elements that were 15 
indicative of an erroneous argument. Each valid example was categorised according to the 16 
type of fallacy it revealed. The group collaboratively considered and reached consensus on 17 
the coding of each excerpt with the author’s direct involvement. Cases were grouped 18 
according to fallacy type. Data validation was demonstrated in data triangulation (collecting 19 
data from 8 participant sub-groups), description of the study procedures, and audit trails. 20 
Researcher characteristics and reflexivity 21 
A Saudi pharmacist and doctoral student completed the interviews. His status as a ‘non-UK-22 
national’, thus lack of UK experience, empowered him to ask impartial questions where the 23 
author, a UK-based health professional and academic might have been at a disadvantage due 24 
to her professional involvement. Nevertheless, the author’s dual qualifications (as a 25 
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pharmacist and a psychologist) were valuable in bridging the clinical (antipsychotic 1 
prescribing) and investigative (fallacious reasoning) domains during analysis, and involving 2 
six Masters-level pharmacy students increased trustworthiness through group review.   3 
RESULTS 4 
A total of 28 participants (17 female) were interviewed from May 2012 to February 2013. 5 
The sample included care-home managers (CHM) (n=5), general practitioners (GPs) (n=5), 6 
community psychiatric nurses (CPNs) (n=7), psychiatrists (n=5), geriatricians (n=2), 7 
primary-care pharmacists (n=2), a memory-clinic nurse, and a social worker.  8 
The dominant, recurring fallacy was the false dichotomy fallacy (around a third of the 9 
recurring fallacies) and there were also examples of appeal to popularity, tradition, 10 
consequence, emotion or fear (with the ‘appeal to’ fallacies accounting for around half of the 11 
examples), and the slippery slope argument (around a fifth of the cases). These examples 12 
spanned the categories set out by the typology of Fearnside and Holther (cited in [12]) and 13 
occurred mainly in answers to questions about initiating, reducing the dose of, and stopping 14 
antipsychotics. 15 
False dichotomy 16 
Fearnside and Holther (cited in [12]) considered false dichotomy to be a material fallacy, 17 
meaning the material of an argument is poorly prepared with an incorrect conclusion being 18 
drawn1. False dichotomy was adopted by a range of respondents in relation to the use of 19 
antipsychotics in patients with dementia. For examples, see the following response to “On 20 
balance do the benefits of medication for behavioural difficulties outweigh the concerns?” 21 
                                                          
1 False dichotomy is where choice is limited to one of two alternatives without highlighting other potentially viable options. 
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“So in some people’s cases it, it’s the lesser of two evils.  You don’t 1 
want to give them medication but you don’t want them to, the whole 2 
home situation to fall apart yeah so it’s weighing it up…..” (CPN 11). 3 
As one of the options is particularly undesirable, maintaining the patient on a high dose is not 4 
only logical (as the argument is presented) but necessary. A range of professionals made 5 
similar arguments, presenting the choice as that of an antipsychotic being initiated or 6 
maintained versus severe or unwanted disruption of care – and no mention of outcomes 7 
between the two extremes. In giving these responses, the interviewees neglected to present 8 
other options in their argument, such as a trial reduction of the dose of an antipsychotic, or 9 
non-pharmacological approaches for addressing symptoms. 10 
A different false dichotomy argument is illustrated in a psychiatrist’s description of a typical 11 
care-home setting in the absence or presence of antipsychotic medication. The following is a 12 
response given to “What’s your opinion in general about guidelines that relate to prescribing 13 
of antipsychotics in dementia?” 14 
“….So they continue on these antipsychotics for ever and ever, they go 15 
into nursing homes, in nursing homes given a choice between having 16 
somebody who’s going to wander around or somebody’s who’s going 17 
to be fairly quiet, sleep in a chair through their shift, staff will always 18 
choose to have somebody who’s going to be quiet and sleep in their 19 
chair because it makes for much easier shifts for them.  So they never 20 
want anyone’s antipsychotics stopped and I think this is part of the 21 
problem.  And I think the guidelines aren’t very clear about what needs 22 
to happen.” (Psych 14) 23 
The complex situation in a care home is distilled down and presented as two simple 24 
alternatives, with one clearly an emotive and controversial opinion about the management of 25 
care homes. Another type of false dichotomy seen in the transcripts is exemplified in a GP’s 26 
response to the same question as above; in the response, a stark contrast is drawn between 27 
using guidelines and ‘going to the other extreme’ and not prescribing them: 28 
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 “I don’t think, I’m not very familiar with the guidelines.  I think, but 1 
what I know of them, I think we have to be careful not to go to the other 2 
extreme where we just say we’re not prescribing them.” (GP 23) 3 
Appeal to popularity/tradition/consequence/emotion/fear 4 
Certain types of fallacies can play up the rhetorical element of an argument, as a tactic to win 5 
the listener over. These were considered by Fearnside and Holther (cited in [12]) to be 6 
psychological fallacies, meaning that the speaker makes a slip-up or uses a ‘trick’ while 7 
presenting the argument – i.e. does not use correct evidence to back the argument.  8 
Appeal to popularity was used numerously in relation to the perceived role of the media in 9 
directing practice. An example is the response provided by a CPN when asked “And would 10 
you tell me please about when should antipsychotics be given to patients with dementia?” 11 
“When?  I mean you see a lot of stuff in the news that obviously, the 12 
health risks of giving antipsychotics to people with dementia and they 13 
should be avoided whenever possible.” (CPN 12) 14 
The response below from an interview with a GP is another example of appeal to popularity. 15 
It is given in relation to “And do you think there’s any change in prescribing antipsychotics in 16 
the recent years, that’s different from the past?” 17 
“There is such a big group of patients now who are all, antipsychotics 18 
are tried for so I think the use of them is increasing maybe because, I 19 
don’t know, we are less afraid of them.  I think doctors are less afraid of 20 
using antipsychotics which wasn’t the case before so I would do a 21 
prescription for risperidone if I get told, right, increase the dose or can 22 
we titrate the dose?  Right, fine.  I’ll call the patient in every month, 23 
gradually increase the dose without worrying.” (GP 28). 24 
Here, the validity of the argument to prescribe antipsychotics appears to rest on a sense that 25 
because there is ‘such a big group of patients’ for whom antipsychotics are tried that this is 26 
acceptable practice. No evidence is offered for being ‘less afraid’ or not ‘worrying’ about 27 
antipsychotic prescribing other than the high occurrence of their use 28 
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Appeal to tradition was also used and one example is the response from a GP interview to 1 
“And do you think prescribing antipsychotics for behavioural difficulties in dementia are 2 
always justified?” 3 
“They should always be justified but I think it’s still used as the easy 4 
option.  Because it’s something as doctors, we do, we just prescribe a 5 
medicine.” (GP 23) 6 
Here, the validity of what happens in practice appears to rest on the fact that doctors ‘just 7 
prescribe a medicine’ (which may well be the traditional role of doctors); but prescribing may 8 
not always be best for the patient.  9 
Appeals to consequence, emotion or fear were also identified. Note for example the way in 10 
which a CPN appeals to the consequence of not giving an antipsychotic to a patient with 11 
dementia, from the perspective of carers in response to: “To what extent do you think that 12 
patients and their relatives can be practically made aware of reasons why antipsychotics are 13 
prescribed?” 14 
“Well I think when we assess them we tell them, we probably tell them 15 
verbally.  I’m not sure what information they would then get from 16 
Pharmacy.  But we always tell people about the risks as well as the 17 
benefits and I think most people say, I’m willing to take that risk 18 
because this is not, I can’t cope with this at the level it’s at so yeah.” 19 
(CPN 11) 20 
Here, the natural conclusion is therefore to give the antipsychotic because the consequence 21 
otherwise is that the carer would not ‘cope’ – this outcome is undesirable and also plays on 22 
the emotional aspects of the situation. Some of the examples of ‘false dichotomy’ also 23 
contained appeals to consequence, emotion or fear.  24 
This multiplicity is illustrated in the next example which relates to an instance where the dose 25 
of an antipsychotic could potentially have been reduced. The question was “And what about 26 
the feedback from the relatives after prescribing antipsychotics?” 27 
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“So I come back and fed that back to her doctor and the doctor said, 1 
well we have to respect the fact that he’s doing a very, very hard job 2 
keeping her at home and home is where she wants to be, home is where 3 
he wants her to be.” (CPN 11) 4 
Here, the clinical decisions made by health professionals are presented in the context of a 5 
desire to keep the patient at home. An appeal is made to the consequence of reducing the 6 
antipsychotic dose, which in this case would mean the patient being unable to stay at home – 7 
there is also an appeal to emotion as the patient’s husband has been doing a ‘hard job keeping 8 
her at home’ and would doubtless be distraught to see her leave. All at the same time, a false 9 
dichotomy is created by presenting only two alternatives – being able to stay at home (if dose 10 
maintained) or having to leave. The same type of argument is made by a psychiatrist in 11 
relation to stopping mediation in response to: “And are there any, is there an improvement 12 
after that medication has been prescribed?” 13 
“Yes.  Oh definitely, yes.  So it makes a huge difference and you’ll be 14 
surprised by the number of times the families actually say to me it’s 15 
made such a huge difference.  And they are the ones who say no, no 16 
don’t stop the antipsychotic because we know how different things were 17 
before they were on them because they see that level of distress 18 
reducing in those patients with the antipsychotics.” (Psych 14) 19 
Appeals to consequence, emotion or fear were not limited to the (positive) impact of 20 
prescribing antipsychotics on carers. A proportion of examples related to the impact of 21 
prescribing on patients’ own state. The example below illustrates the perceived effect of 22 
antipsychotics on patients in response to: “And how long does it take for this benefit [of 23 
prescribing antipsychotics] to show?” 24 
“Initially a couple of days because their, it gets into their system and I, 25 
it appears that it makes them a little bit more sleepy until their body 26 
adjusts to it so they are calmer, but as they get used to it in their system 27 
we notice that they’re just more co-operative and more relaxed.” (CHM 28 
3) 29 
An additional example is given here in response to: “And what are the benefits [of 30 
antipsychotic prescribing]?” 31 
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“They’re quieter, more subdued, less distressed.  The man that I saw 1 
last week that had been prescribed them, who’s got dementia, he was 2 
just weeping inconsolably, he’s got dementia and he was weeping for 3 
his wife who has been dead for many years, and they put him on 4 
quetiapine.  And I mean he gets tearful if you talk about his wife now, 5 
but the uncontrollable weeping had stopped.”  (GP 7) 6 
 7 
Slippery slope argument 8 
The slippery slope argument was considered by Fearnside and Holther (cited in [12]) to be a 9 
logical fallacy, meaning that the machinery of the argument malfunctions – i.e. there is a 10 
structural breakdown in the logic of what is presented. The example provided below was 11 
typical, provided in response to: “On balance do the benefits of medication for behavioural 12 
difficulties outweigh the concerns?” 13 
“It’s funny I was just talking to one of our consultants about a lady that 14 
I visit, if she wasn’t on these, the medication, at the level she’s on, her 15 
husband wouldn’t be able to manage her at home.  But I think if he 16 
couldn’t manage at home then she would have to go into residential 17 
care and if she was in residential care they would need far higher doses 18 
of the medication to manage her.” (CPN 11) 19 
The excerpt focusses on antipsychotic usage in a patient with dementia living at home, as 20 
described by a CPN. Again, there are several other fallacies also in operation here.  The 21 
slippery slope element relates to the chain of events predicted to happen should the patient 22 
not have been on ‘the medication, at the level she’s on’. A prediction of gloom is made ‘she 23 
would have to go into residential care and if she was in residential care they would need far 24 
higher doses of the medication to manage her’ whereas in actual fact reducing the dose might 25 
not have resulted in a) the husband not being able to cope, b) the patient leaving their own 26 
home and going into residential care, c) care-home staff not being able to manage the patient, 27 
d) patient therefore needing higher doses. 28 
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DISCUSSION 1 
A range of fallacious arguments with the potential to incorrectly construct and validate 2 
antipsychotic prescribing in dementia were identified in health professional and care-home 3 
manager interviews. False dichotomy was the dominant fallacy and also appeal to popularity, 4 
tradition, consequence, emotion or fear, and the slippery slope argument were identified in 5 
the interviewees’ answers to questions about antipsychotic prescribing in dementia. False 6 
dichotomy was frequently used to explain the prescribing of antipsychotics or the 7 
continuation of an already-prescribed dose. This type of argument can be particularly 8 
convincing when one of the choices is framed in such bad light that the other seems the only 9 
viable option. The arguments were formulated to illustrate the negative consequences of 10 
alternative choices (e.g. reducing the dose or not prescribing) on carers and patients, for 11 
example in terms of coping and stress; whether the patient could remain in their own home or 12 
be manageable within a care-home setting. False dichotomies can be seen not to really 13 
present a choice to the listener. They are framed such that not prescribing antipsychotics, 14 
actually following the guidelines, or lowering the dose of antipsychotics, seem detrimental to 15 
patient care.  16 
Sometimes false dichotomies were supplemented with the negative aftereffects framed as a 17 
series of ‘slippery slope’ events, again presenting the situation in such a way that prescribing 18 
or maintaining the dose of an already-prescribed antipsychotic became the only apparent 19 
option. Appeal to popularity was also identified, communicating the perceived authority of 20 
the media in driving practitioner behaviours. Yet the truth should not emerge from the news 21 
and health professionals have a duty to base prescribing decisions on published guidelines 22 
and other published evidence. Appeal to popularity as a form of fallacious argument was also 23 
used to justify the prevalence of antipsychotic prescribing in dementia, from a ‘safety in 24 
numbers’ standpoint. Doctors may be justified or not justified in prescribing antipsychotics 25 
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but there is no safety in numbers and being part of a large group does not reduce the risks. 1 
Similarly, appeal to tradition was used to support existing practices relating to antipsychotic 2 
prescribing or review as were appeals to consequence, emotion or fear.  3 
Taken at face value appeals to consequence, emotion or fear, are extremely powerful 4 
arguments because they manipulate the listener’s emotions to make a convincing argument. 5 
The point is that (according to the NICE guidelines [1]) antipsychotics should not be 6 
prescribed to reduce stress in carers, enable carers and care-home staff to cope, keep the 7 
patient at home, allow the patient to attend a day centre, reduce stress in carers, or because 8 
the carer is crying. Nor should they be prescribed to make the patient cooperative, relaxed, 9 
calm, quiet, subdued, because they were distressed, weeping or agitated. These are not 10 
indications listed in the marketing authorisation for antipsychotics.  11 
Fallacies in care-home managers’ and health professionals’ discussions about antipsychotic 12 
prescribing in dementia were identified among those based in one English county, although 13 
the sample size is in line with other qualitative studies utilizing in-depth interviews. How 14 
people think and speak communicates and corroborates their understanding of social 15 
phenomena; it also has a role in constructing and verifying their version of reality, which in 16 
turn has the potential to impact on their own, and others’ actions and behaviours [16]. The 17 
fallacious arguments in the conversations appeared to authenticate potentially inappropriate 18 
prescribing and could in theory contribute to the practice through implicit assumptions about 19 
these medicines that could shape opinions and therefore actual practice. But the examples of 20 
fallacious reasoning in themselves do not provide direct evidence for inappropriate practice; 21 
they are responses provided in good faith to interview questions.  So it is essential to state that 22 
while this paper focusses on the fallacious arguments made by the participants, this is not to 23 
establish bad practice on their part, but to illustrate the types of arguments that can be made 24 
by professionals in general. 25 
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A recent US study found that the reasons given for the use of antipsychotic medication in 1 
nursing-home residents with dementia frequently related to a wide variety of indications for 2 
which the medications are not approved and for which evidence of efficacy is lacking [19]. 3 
For example, as well as psychiatric (e.g. loss of contact with reality, depression, anxiety) and 4 
behavioural reasons (e.g. verbal and physical aggression), emotional reasons were cited for 5 
the use of antipsychotics including that the resident was angry or agitated, or even “sad” or 6 
“crying”—thus also linking emotional consequences to inappropriate prescribing [19]. 7 
Numerous fallacious arguments in this study concerned coping with the patient, either within 8 
their own home environment or within a care-home setting and it was not possible to draw a 9 
distinction between the two settings in terms of the arguments used although there are 10 
numerous studies that demonstrate higher antipsychotic use in formal care settings. For 11 
example, a study published in 2012 reported that while 7.3% of people with dementia living 12 
in their own home received an antipsychotic prescription, this compared to 25.5% of patients 13 
with dementia in care homes [20]. In another study published in 2013, psychotropic 14 
medication use in general was found to be higher in care homes compared to the community 15 
setting (20.3% vs 1.1%), and antipsychotics prescribing increased from 8.2% before entry to 16 
18.6% after patients entered care homes [21]. These differences could of course be associated 17 
with an increase in symptom severity as the patient moves from their own home to the care 18 
home environment.  19 
International studies draw attention to variability in the use of antipsychotics between 20 
different care homes, which authors relate to care home characteristics and patient 21 
satisfaction [22] and characteristics of psychiatric consultant groups [23]. Certainly a 22 
multitude of interventional studies have attempted to reduce antipsychotic prescribing for 23 
people with dementia in care homes, and while some interventions are effective in the short-24 
term, there is a continuing need for effective interventions that might address the culture and 25 
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nature of the different care settings [24]. Identifying a role for fallacious arguments in 1 
potentially inappropriate antipsychotic prescribing in dementia can inform future studies that 2 
focus, for example, on changing people’s thinking patterns and reasoning. The categorisation 3 
of fallacious arguments as material, psychological and logical fallacies may be helpful in 4 
such studies, which could focus on highlighting and challenging the common arguments that 5 
construct and validate antipsychotic prescribing and continuation of prescribing in dementia, 6 
where it is not warranted.  7 
CONCLUSIONS 8 
This is the first study that examines in depth the use of fallacious arguments in relation to 9 
initiating, reducing the dose of and stopping antipsychotics in dementia. Through false 10 
dichotomy in the main and also slippery slope argument and appeal to a range of conditions, 11 
the case presented in this article is that fallacious arguments used by professionals involved in 12 
caring for patients with dementia could be constructing and validating implicit assumptions 13 
about antipsychotic prescribing in this condition. Where fallacious arguments are used, the 14 
rationale for not prescribing or for reducing the dose of antipsychotics already prescribed are 15 
convincingly presented in such undesirable light that prescribing or maintaining an existing 16 
dose become the only viable options. These types of fallacies are powerful and could sway 17 
practice. The findings could help practitioners, researchers and policy makers to contemplate 18 
and attempt to mitigate the effect of possible logic-based errors in the inappropriate 19 
prescribing of antipsychotics in dementia through formal training and interventions. 20 
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 1 
Type of Fallacy Definition of Fallacy Form of Fallacy 
Ad hominem [18] A person’s argument is based on their 
presumed honesty, ethical character or 
trustworthiness.  
Person A makes claim C.  
Person B makes an attack on person A.  
Therefore A’s ‘claim C’ is false. 
Ad novitam [17] It is assumed that the ‘new’ technology is 
better than the existing technology and that it 
should be implemented and used. 
A is a new technology 
A is better than the existing technology.  
A should be implemented and used. 
Affirming the 
consequent [12] 
Inferring the truth of the antecedent of an 
implication from the truth of the consequent. 
If A then B 
B  
So, A 
Appeal to consequences 
or to fear [18] 
The argument concludes a premise (usually a 
belief) is either true or false based on 
whether it leads to desirable or undesirable 
consequences. 
If you don’t accept A as true, something 
terrible will happen. 
Therefore, A must be accepted. 
Appeal to emotion [18] Emotion is used in place of reason in an 
attempt to win the argument. 
Favourable emotions are associated with 
A.  
Therefore, A is to be accepted. 
Appeal to popularity (or 
bandwagon or Ad-
Populum fallacy) [12] 
Peer-pressure or popularity is substituted for 
evidence in an argument. 
A believes X 
B believes X 
So, C ought to believe X 
Appeal to tradition [18] It is assumed that something is better or 
correct simply because it is older, traditional. 
A is old or traditional 
Therefore, A is correct or better. 
Begging the question 
[12] 
(or circular reasoning) 
The conclusion of an argument is used as a 
premise of that same argument. 
A implies B and A is only valid because 
B is assumed 
Confirmation bias [18] Information is favoured that confirms 
preconceptions or hypotheses regardless of 
whether the information is true.  
A is claimed to be correct, because it 
confirms a person’s preconceptions 
False cause (or Post Hoc The inference of causation is from temporal Event A is followed by event B. 
20 
 
Table 1. Common fallacious arguments derived from the literature 1 
fallacy) [12] succession alone. Event A caused event B. 
False dichotomy [12] The choice is limited to one of two 
alternatives (without highlighting other 
potentially viable options) where only one of 
the alternatives is acceptable. 
Either A or B, 
Clearly not A, 
So, B 
Gambler’s fallacy [18] An event is judged less likely to occur if it 
has occurred recently  
The likelihood of A happening to B is 
small as A has just happened to C 
Non-anticipation [18] A new idea is rejected because of the 
assumption that all there is to know on the 
subject is already known.  
A is not previously known to cause B.  
Therefore A does not cause B. 
Red herring [12] 
(or smoke screen, wild 
goose chase) 
An irrelevant topic is presented in order to 
divert attention from the original issue. 
Topic A is under discussion 
Topic B is introduced under the guise of 
being relevant to topic A (when it is 
actually not relevant) 
Topic A is abandoned 
Slippery slope (or thin 
end of the wedge) [18] 
An assertion is made that some event must 
inevitably follow from another without 
evidence or argument. 
If A happens, then by a gradual series of 
small steps through B, C,…, X, Y, 
eventually Z will happen, too. 
Weak analogy [12] A claim is made that if two ideas, things, or 
circumstances are alike in a number of ways, 
then they will be alike in some further way. 
A is the same as B—for property 1 
A is the same as B—for property 2 
So, A must be the same as B for 
property 3. 
